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"Waiving" Goodbye to Rights: Plea
Bargaining and the Defense Dilemma of
Competent Representation
by JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY and MARISA MAIN*
The proposed amendments to the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards for Prosecutors and Defense Lawyers ("Proposed
Standards") address a number of problematic issues related to the
roles of both prosecutors and defense attorneys. This Symposium
Article considers waiver of rights in the context of the Standards,
focusing on guilty pleas and the so-called "preconditions" that
prosecutors generally require before even entertaining the
defendant's proffer, colloquially termed "Queen for a Day"
agreements.' It reviews the development in the law since 1993; the
changes in the practice since that time; and the proposed changes to
the Standards. The article focuses on the complex obligations of
criminal defense attorneys to investigate their cases and give
competent advice to their clients in the shadow of proffers and pleas.
It concludes that attorneys in this role face an almost insoluble
dilemma and hopes that the Proposed Standards provide an
important first step to resolving it. The paper includes an appendix
providing an historical breakdown of pleas and trials in federal courts
from 1987 to 2009.2
* Jane Campbell Moriarty, Professor and Director of Faculty Research and
Development, University of Akron School of Law and Marisa Main, J.D. anticipated 2011,
University of Akron School of Law. Thanks to Bruce Green and Rory Little for the
invitation to participate in the Symposium, Andrew Taslitz for helpful comments on a
draft, and Gary Zimmerman for providing redacted plea agreements.
1. For a more detailed explanation of these agreements, see Andrew E. Taslitz,
Prosecutorial Preconditions to Plea Negotiations, 23 CRIM. JUST. 14 (2008); and Benjamin
A. Naftalis, "Queen For a Day" Agreements and the Proper Scope of Permissible Waiver of
the Federal Plea Statement Rules, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (2004).
2. Most of the discussion focuses on federal law, which provides the minimum floor
for constitutional protections. Many of the same concerns, however, are present in plea
agreements in state courts as well.
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Introduction
During a telephone discussion with a United States District
Court Judge in July, 2010, he spoke of the "hydraulic pressure to
plead" that exists in the criminal justice system: "The system depends
on pleas," he said.! That the system depends on the cooperation of
defendants not to go to trial is nothing new-nearly twenty years ago,
two commentators noted that plea bargaining "is not some adjunct to
the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system."' For
decades, the percentage of cases going to trial has been minimal in
relation to the overall number of defendants charged with crimes.!
But what has changed, perhaps, is this "hydraulic" pressure. Due to
mandatory minimum sentences and sentencing guidelines,
prosecutors have enormous leverage over defendants in the
negotiation of plea agreements since defendants who choose not to
plead face staggering risks. Indeed, the statistics showing the
substantial increase in federal pleas between 1987 and 2009 (from
87% to more than 95% of all cases) is strong proof of the pressure
upon defendants to plead. In the last three years, on average, only
3.87% of all federal defendants took their case to trial. State cases
likewise depend on plea agreements, with an average of 95%
8pleading guilty each year for the last five years.
3. Telephone interview between the Honorable William G. Young, Judge, United
States District Court, District of Mass., and Jane Moriarty, July 28, 2010. Notes of
discussion on file with author. See also United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282,
284, n. 5 (D. Mass. 2006) (discussing, inter alia, factors that increase the "hydraulic
pressure" to plead guilty).
4. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909,1912 (1992).
5. From 1985 to 2009, the percentage of pleas entered in federal district court has
risen dramatically, from approximately 87% to over 95%. See Appendix I, appended.
Equally startling is the actual number of people convicted by plea or trial during that same
time period. Fewer than 40,000 people were convicted in federal court in 1985 while more
than 85,000 were convicted in 2009. The number of actual convictions rose steadily, along
with the number of guilty pleas.
6. "[Tlhe Department [of Justice] is so addicted to plea bargaining to leverage its
law enforcement resources to an overwhelming conviction rate that the focus of our entire
criminal justice system has shifted far away from trials and juries and adjudication to a
massive system of sentence bargaining that is heavily rigged against the accused citizen."
United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass. 2004), decision vacated in part
on other grounds and remanded, United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005),
vacated and remanded by United States v. Pacheco, 434 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2006).
7. See Appendix I, infra. In 2007, 2008, and 2009, the percentage of defendants
pleading guilty was 95.8%, 96.3%, and 96.3%, respectively.
8. See id.
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Thus, in 2011, we must look at the concept of "waiver of
rights"-particularly the right to trial-as resting upon a new
landscape. Since the current Standards were published in 1993, courts
have decided many opinions relevant to waiver of rights and several
commentators have written thoughtfully about the subject in the last
several years.! The Proposed Standards differ substantially from the
1993 version and address many of the concerns this article raises. As
will be clear from the article, the law of waiver has expanded
exponentially in the last few decades, necessitating a change in the
current Standards.
I. Waiver of Rights in the Courts
Waiver of rights may be implicated at every step in the process in
which a right is involved: The right to remain silent; the right to
counsel; the right to trial by jury; the right not to testify; the right to
object to admissibility of evidence; the right to allocution; the right to
appeal; the right to appeal execution orders, and certain habeas
corpus rights.o
The United States Supreme Court has held with great regularity
that a defendant has the right to waive rights in a variety of contexts,
going so far as to find a "presumption of waivability."nl In the
decision to plead guilty, a defendant waives the right to a trial and in
so doing, may waive the right to receive certain types of impeachment
evidence,1 as well as the rights against compulsory self-incrimination
9. See Taslitz, supra note 1; Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure,
and Wrongful Conviction, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 651 (2007); Maximo Langer,
Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in
American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223 (2006); Daniel P. Blank, Plea
Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's Guide to Loss, Abandonment, and
Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011 (2000): Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea
Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121 (1998). For an earlier article, see Kevin C.
McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957
(1989).
10. See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's
Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2011-14 (2000)
(discussing the various rights that criminal defendants waive in the plea bargaining
process).
11. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 202 (1995).
12. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) ("[T]he Constitution does not
require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a
plea agreement . . ").
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and confrontation.13 According to many federal courts of appeal,
defendants may waive the right to appeal any errors that occurred in
the sentencing,14 and the right to collaterally attack the plea or
sentence in some circumstances." The defendant may also waive
various exclusionary rules of evidence and may stipulate to the
admissibility of evidence.16 If the defendant is determined to be
competent, she may also waive the appeals challenging her execution
17in a death penalty case.
13. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). Accord Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S.
389, 398 (1993).
14. "Most courts, including all twelve federal courts of appeals with criminal
jurisdiction, uphold appeal waivers, so long as the waiver is made voluntarily and with an
understanding of the consequences." WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 27.5(c), Waiver or Forfeiture of the Right of Appeal (2009 Supp.).
15. Accord United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) ("emphatically
reject[ing]" the contention that the defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of his right
to appeal "should not bar consideration of his appeal, because counsel was ineffective not
at the time of the plea, but at sentencing"); Davilia v. United States, 258 F.3d 448, 451 (6th
Cir. 2001) (joining the majority of other circuits in holding that if a plea agreement is made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, it can waive the right to collateral review, except
when the ineffective assistance of counsel claim relates directly to the plea agreement or
waiver). See United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that a waiver of rights under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is generally enforceable, except
when alleging the counsel who represented defendant during the plea was ineffective in
actually negotiating the plea-not just the sentence); United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336,
343 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[W]e will follow [the] wealth of authority and hold that an ineffective
assistance of counsel argument survives a waiver of appeal only when the claimed
assistance directly affected the validity of that waiver or the plea itself."). See also Mason
v. United States, 211 F.3d 1065, 1069 (7th Cir. 2000) (Since defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim related only to his attorney's performance at sentencing, and
had nothing to do with the attorney's negotiation of the waiver, his claim was barred
because he had waived his right to seek post-conviction relief through appeal.).
16. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 202-03 (1995) (defendant may waive
objections to the admissibility of evidence and may stipulate to evidence); Godinez, 509
U.S. at 398.
17. See generally, Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (terminating the stay of
execution of Gary Gilmore after finding that the lower courts had found a knowing,
intelligent, and competent waiver of rights); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154
(1990) (seeming to recognize the right to waive appeals following a death sentence). For a
detailed discussion about death-penalty waivers, see John H. Blume, Killing the Willing:
"Volunteers," Suicide, and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939, 943-44 (2005) (discussing
death penalty waivers and proposing a standard for assessing such waivers that strikes a
balance between the desire to prevent death row inmates from using the death penalty as
a means of committing state-assisted suicide, yet protecting the right of mentally healthy
inmates to forgo further appeals and accept punishment); and Amy Smith, Not "Waiving"
But Drowning: The Anatomy of Death Row Syndrome and Volunteering For Execution, 17
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 237, 238, 252-53 (2008) (discussing the effects of death row on inmates
and noting the rise in "volunteering," or waiving, all state and federally mandated rights to
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Nonetheless, there are some limitations placed on waivers of
rights, particularly as concerns the waiver of trial rights. First, the
Supreme Court has remarked that while a defendant gives up various
constitutional guarantees when entering a guilty plea," the guilty plea
be made both knowingly and voluntarily-albeit what constitutes
"knowing and voluntarily" is a bare-bones standard." Additionally,
"[t]here may be some evidentiary provisions that are so fundamental
to the reliability of the fact finding process that they may never be
waived without irreparably 'discredit[ing] the federal courts."'20 What
those evidentiary provisions might be, however, is somewhat
uncertain.
A. Preconditional Waivers and Proffers
Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and (the former
version of) Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure both
provide, in parallel language, that any statement made in the course
of an unsuccessful plea negotiation is not admissible in any
proceeding against the defendant.2 1 The hortatory goal of these
appeal, and the parallel increase in lengths of time inmates spend on death row, between
sentencing and execution).
18. These include the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the
Sixth Amendment right to confront one's accusers. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 628.
19. Id. at 629. The Supreme Court in Ruiz determined that the Constitution did not
require complete knowledge of all relevant circumstances. Rather, a court may accept a
plea "despite various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor." Id.
at 630. As described by one court of appeals, a defendant's comprehension of the
consequences of the waiver need not be perfect. It is the defendant's understanding of the
rights being relinquished, not all possible repercussions of relinquishing them, that defines
the waiver as knowing. See United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 1026 (7th Cir. 1998).
Proving the voluntariness of the plea is also a potentially low hurdle. See, e.g., United
States v. Mitchell, 2011 WL 322371, *4 (10th Cir.) (even a defendant strongly pressured by
prior counsel could not claim the plea was involuntary after he chose to enter the plea and
affirmed it on the record). Accord, United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 417 (10th Cir.
1996).
20. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204 (citing 21 Wright & Graham § 5039, at 207-08).
21. FED. R. EVID. 410. Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related
Statements, provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following
is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the
plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: (1) a plea of guilty which was later
withdrawn; (2) a plea of nolo contendere; (3) any statement made in the course of any
proceedings under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable
state procedure regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or (4) any statement made in the
course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not
result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn."
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another statement
made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the
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provisions was to encourage a free and open discussion among
prosecutors, defendants, and defense lawyers to seek agreement and
eliminate the need for trial in many cases.22 Rule 410 reflected both
U.S. Supreme Court practice 23 and long-standing policy. 24
Nonetheless, prosecutors began to encourage defendants to
waive the protection of Rule 410 by refusing to engage in plea
discussions without preconditional waivers. This prosecutorial power
grew as a response to the enactment of mandatory minimums and
sentencing guidelines, which collectively shifted much of the power to
the prosecutors to rewrite criminal practice. 25  As defense lawyers
challenged the practice of preconditional waivers, cases worked their
way up to the Supreme Court. In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court held
in United States v. Mezzanatto that absent some affirmative indication
that an agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an
agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of the plea-statement
Rules was valid and enforceable.26
In Mezzanatto, the defendant agreed to enter into plea
discussions with the government concerning contraband crimes. The
prosecutor warned defendant that if he wanted to cooperate, he had
to be completely truthful in his proffer. As a precondition, he would
have to agree that any statement made during the discussions could
be used to impeach any contradictory testimony he might give at trial
if the case proceeded that far. Defendant agreed, then proceeded to
mislead the prosecutor, and was confronted with surveillance
evidence proving defendant's deception. Plea negotiations were
statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal
proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant
under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel.
22. United States v. Young, 2011 WL 96627 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 11, 2011) (discussing the
policy goals and legislative history of these rules). See FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory
committee's note ("[E]xclusion of offers to plead guilty or nolo has as its purpose the
promotion of disposition of criminal cases by compromise.") (citing MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 251, 543 (Hornbook 2011).
23. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927) (disallowing evidence of a
withdrawn plea in a federal prosecution).
24. "Free communication is needed, and security against having an offer of
compromise or related statement admitted in evidence effectively encourages it." FED. R.
EVID. 410 Advisory Committee's Note.
25. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF.
L. REV. 1471, 1505-06 (1993) (discussing the empowering effect of the sentencing
guidelines for prosecutors in the plea bargaining process and the resulting drastic changes
to the nature of plea bargaining, and proposing possible solutions).
26. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210.
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broken off by the prosecutor and the case ultimately went to trial,
with Mezzanatto taking the stand. At trial, prosecutor impeached
defendant with the statements he'd made during the plea discussion.27
Mezzanatto argued that Rule 410's protections were not
waivable and should bar the admission of defendant's statements into
evidence. A majority of the Supreme Court disagreed with
Mezzanatto, finding the defendant's arguments unpersuasive and
holding the waiver of rights was permissible.' The Court believed
that admission of plea statements for impeachment purposes
enhances the truth-seeking function of trials. It also determined that
the plea-statement Rules expressly contemplate a degree of party
control that is consonant with the presumption of waivability.
Additionally, the Court disagreed that allowing such waiver would
discourage plea bargaining, reasoning that some prosecutors may be
"especially reluctant" to negotiate in the absence of a waiver.2 9
Finally, the Court was not persuaded that waiver agreements invite
prosecutorial overreaching and abuse. "The mere potential for abuse
of prosecutorial bargaining power is an insufficient basis for
foreclosing negotiation altogether."" Rather, on a case-by-case basis,
the courts could consider whether the waiver agreement was the
product of "fraud or coercion" -an exceptionally difficult standard
to meet.
In concurrence, Justice Ginsburg noted that allowing the use of
statements to impeach was compatible with "Congress' intent to
promote plea bargaining." 32 Nonetheless, she noted that a waiver to
use such statements in the case-in-chief "would more severely
undermine a defendant's incentive to negotiate, and thereby inhibit
plea bargaining.",3
Joined by Justice Stevens, Justices Souter dissented, finding that
the majority ruling was "at odds with the intent of Congress and will
render the Rules largely dead letters."" While the dissenters agreed
27. Id. at 199.
28. Id. at 200-01.
29. Id. at 207.
30. Id. at 210.
31. Id. It appears that Mezzanatto may also leave open the right to challenge the
agreement if it were not entered into "knowingly or voluntarily." For a more complete
description of what this standard entails (or does not entail), see supra notes 16-20.
32. Id. at 211 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
33. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
34. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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with the "general presumption in favor of recognizing waivers of
rights," they believed that the express language of Congress in Rule
410 and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were
controlling." Although the dissent remarked on the limited nature of
the decision, it worried that the inevitable result of the reasoning used
by the majority would, in time, come to function as a waiver of trial
itself."
Post-Mezzanatto, the waiver-of-rights precondition to the proffer
has become standard in the federal courts and the permissible scope
of the waiver has also expanded. As a 2007 National Law Journal
article remarked, "[f]ederal prosecutors are now insisting, as part of
the plea agreement process, that defendants waive their 'rights'
under ... FRE 410 .. . [and] Mezzanatto has served as the foundation
for a line of cases that have expanded the breadth of these waivers
over time."3 7
In addition to permitting statements to be used for impeachment,
a number of Circuits have approved of case-in-chief waivers. In
United States v. Sylvester, the Fifth Circuit extended the reach of
Mezzanatto to include such waivers." Sylvester was arrested for
murder and the government offered to seek life imprisonment and to
forego the death penalty in exchange for a full confession and plea of
guilty. As part of the plea, the government required the defendant to
sign a waiver, which provided that in the event the plea negotiations
failed, the government could use the confession of the defendant in its
case in chief. Sylvester agreed, signed, and confessed. After engaging
retained counsel (to replace appointed counsel), he sought to
withdraw his plea and go to trial. 9 The court, over defense objection,
allowed the government to introduce Sylvester's confession, and the
defendant was convicted.'
35. Id. at 211-12.
36. Id. at 217.
37. Mark Calloway, et al., More Defendants are Asked to Waive Plea Deal Rights;
Prosecutors Increasingly Insist that Defendants Waive Protections Against Use of
Statements at Trial, NAT'L L.J. S1 (Col. 1), July 23, 2007.
38. See 583 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2009); See also United States v. Stevens, 2010 WL
5343189, *3 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 21, 2010) (reviewing Mezzanatto and the extension in
Sylvester, and finding that "no policy reasons prohibit the Court from enforcing
Defendant's Rule 410 waiver and admitting the stipulation of facts into evidence in the
Government's case-in-chief.").
39. 583 F.3d at 287.
40. Id. at 288.
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The Fifth Circuit saw no meaningful distinction between a
voluntary waiver to admit testimony in rebuttal and in the case in
chief, noting that both waivers "enhan[ce] the truth-seeking function
of trials and will result in more accurate verdicts."4 1 The court noted
two "salient prosecutorial functions" these waivers serve: They allow
the prosecution to use the defendant's plea statements in opening
argument and allow the use of such statements even if the defendant
limits his defense to credibility impeachment of government witnesses
or even if he "declines to wage any defense at all."42 Several circuits
41now permit case-in-chief waivers.
Other courts have permitted prosecutors to use statements
broadly as a form of rebuttal evidence. In United States v. Rebbe, the
concept of rebuttal was interpreted to include the defendant's case,
not solely the defendant's testimony.44 Rebbe signed a waiver before
plea discussions permitting the government to use statements of the
defendant or "evidence obtained directly or indirectly from those
statements ... to rebut any evidence, argument, or representations
offered by or on behalf [of the defendant]." 45 After Rebbe made
several incriminating statements, the plea discussions fell apart and
the case went to trial. At trial, the prosecution put on its case in chief
and rested. Defendant's attorney asked for an advisory ruling about
the admissibility of the incriminating statements should he put on a
defense, which the court declined to grant. Defendant called four
witnesses in support of his case (although he did not testify) and the
court allowed the Government to introduce the statements as rebuttal
evidence.46 The Ninth Circuit upheld the admissibility of such
statements. Since "Rebbe presented a defense that was inconsistent
with his proffer statements and the Government did not seek to admit
Rebbe's ... statement in its case-in-chief, we cannot discern any
error ... ."47
41. Id. at 290 (quoting Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204).
42. 583 F.3d at 293.
43. See United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1322-23 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States
v. Young, 223 F.3d 905, 911 (8th Cir. 2000); and United States v. Mitchell, 2011 WL
322371, *9 (10th Cir.) (all upholding case-in-chief waivers).
44. United States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2002).
45. Id. at 404.
46. Id. at 405.
47. Id. at 407. Accord, United States v. Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 570-71 (3d Cir. 2008)
(approving the admission of defendant's plea statements after the close of government's
case, since the terms of the waiver were expansive: "to rebut any evidence or
arguments....") (emphasis in original).
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In United States v. Krilich," the defendant signed a conditional
waiver allowing the government to use "the substance of the proffer"
at trial for impeachment or "in rebuttal testimony," should the
defendant "testify contrary to the substance of the proffer or
otherwise present a position inconsistent with the proffer." 49 Judge
Easterbrook, writing for the majority, claimed the court would give
neither a "stingy reading nor a generous one" to the conditional
waiver, but rather "a natural reading, which leaves the parties in
control through their choice of language." 0 The court agreed that the
prosecutor could introduce evidence that "contradicted the proffer."
Once the defense cross-examinated witnesses to elicit evidence that
was contrary to the defendant's proffer, the court permitted the
introduction of the proffer statements." The court disagreed,
however, that once the defendant puts on any defense, the statements
would be admissible. Rather, the "judge must find genuine
inconsistency before allowing use of the statements."5 2 Post-
Mezzanatto, questions remain about whether the defendant
essentially waives the right to any real defense once he signs a
preconditional waiver that permits the prosecution to proffer
evidence "to rebut" his case. At least in some circuits, defendants
may be waiving the right to trial for the privilege of making a proffer.
If prosecutors consistently require these preconditional waivers, then
the dissent in Mezzanatto was prescient in its concern that the case
would turn section 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence into a "dead
letter"" in criminal cases. Moreover, it is particularly troubling that
this de facto trial waiver is made before the plea discussion-simply
for the right to even discuss a potentially unsuccessful plea.
B. Remaining Uncertainties about Waivers
In addition to the use of proffer statements in trial, there are
other waiver problems inherent in plea agreements. In United States
v. Ruiz, the defendant refused to accept a plea agreement because it
required her to waive the right to obtain impeachment evidence
48. United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1998).
49. Id. at 1024.
50. Id. at 1025.
51. Id. at 1025-26.
52. 159 F.3d at 1025.
53. U.S. v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 211 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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under Brady v. Maryland.' The Court held that "the Constitution
does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment
evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal
defendant."" Ruiz did not address whether the right to obtain actual
exculpatory information-evidence tending to prove the defendant is
not guilty of the crime or is guilty of a lesser crime than that which he
is charged-may be likewise waived.
To date, there is a split of opinion on whether Ruiz imposes an
obligation to disclose exculpatory information. In a July, 2010
decision, the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut held that there was a distinction between the obligation
to provide exculpatory information and material impeachment
evidence, stating "the court declines ... to hold that Ruiz applies to
exculpatory as well as impeachment material."" As the court in
Danzi recognized, some courts have held Ruiz does apply to
exculpatory information" while others courts have held that Ruiz
does not.59 It also noted that pre-Ruiz case law in the Second Circuit
54. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). See also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963).
55. 536 U.S.at 633.
56. United States v. Danzi, 726 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D. Conn. 2010), ruling clarified in
United States v. Danzi, 2010 WL 3463272 (D.Conn)
57. 726 F.Supp. 2d at 128.
58. See Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the issue in
dicta and stating that "the Supreme Court has consistently treated exculpatory and
impeachment evidence in the same way for the purpose of defining the obligation of a
prosecutor to provide Brady material prior to trial, and the reasoning underlying Ruiz
could support a similar ruling for a prosecutor's obligations prior to a guilty plea"); United
States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting in dicta that "the Supreme
Court has not addressed the question of whether the Brady right to exculpatory
information, in contrast to impeachment information, might be extended to the guilty plea
context," but declining to decide the issue because "even if [the Court] were to assume
that the prosecution's failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence at the plea stage
could result in an unknowing plea in certain narrow circumstances, Moussaoui cannot
demonstrate that his guilty plea was entered unknowingly for this reason"); United States
v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 1502 (2010) ("Conroy
argues that the limitation of the Court's discussion [in Ruiz] to impeachment evidence
implies that exculpatory evidence is different and must be turned over before entry of a
plea. Ruiz never makes such a distinction nor can this proposition be implied from its
discussion.").
59. See United States v. Ohiri, 133 F. App'x 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005) ("By holding in
Ruiz that the government committed no due process violation by requiring a defendant to
waive her right to impeachment evidence before indictment in order to accept a fast-track
plea, the Supreme Court did not imply that the government may avoid the consequences
of a Brady violation if the defendant accepts an eleventh-hour plea agreement while
ignorant of withheld exculpatory evidence in the government's possession."); McCann v.
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required the prosecution to turn over exculpatory evidence prior to a
plea agreement.6o
Thus, the state of the law is unsettled, 6' and there is a conflict
among the courts. We believe that there must be a requirement-
both as a matter of constitutional law and ethical obligation-for
prosecutors to provide exculpatory information before entering into
plea agreements. 62  Although courts do not seem to agree, we also
believe, as a matter of competent representation obligations, defense
counsel should have much greater access to prosecutorial evidence
before pleas are entered or preconditional waivers are signed or
guilty pleas are entered.
H. The Defense Dilemma
With the consistent and widespread use of plea bargaining,
preconditional waivers, and pressures from guidelines and minimum
mandatory sentencing, the role of defense counsel has become both
cabined and marginalized. Faced with the potential for draconian
prison terms for clients who are unsuccessful at trial, criminal defense
attorneys possess little bargaining power and shoulder a heavy
burden to ascertain what constitutes good advice. In fact, plea
Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating in dicta that "Ruiz indicates a
significant distinction between impeachment information and exculpatory evidence of
actual innocence," and that "[g]iven this distinction, it is highly likely the Supreme Court
would find a violation of the Due Process Clause if prosecutors or other relevant
government actors have knowledge of a criminal defendant's factual innocence but fail to
disclose such information to a defendant before he enters into a guilty plea").
60. Danzi, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 126.
61. See e.g., Garrett v. United States, No. 2:05cv323, 2006 WL 1647314 (E.D. Va. June
13, 2006) (assuming but declining to decide the issue of whether exculpatory evidence
must be disclosed at the plea stage); Ferrara v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 2d 384, 409 (D.
Mass. 2005) (finding that the government's decision to not disclose material exculpatory
information undermined the reliability of a guilty plea, which could therefore be vacated
in a § 2255 proceeding and noting that "Ruiz ... confirms rather than contradicts this
conclusion."); In re Miranda, 182 P.3d 513, 543 n.6 (Cal. 2008) (citing conflicting cases on
whether prosecutors must disclose exculpatory information pre-plea and declining to
decide the issue).
62. A full exposition of the foundation for that opinion is outside the scope of this
paper, but both Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCr R. 3.8 clearly require timely prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence.
Brady and its progeny require defense counsel to request such evidence; MODEL RULE.
3.8(d) places the burden entirely on the prosecutor. For further discussion of this issue,
see Fred C. Zacharius & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5-11 (2009); and
Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance
of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1982).
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bargaining seems to be an outmoded term to describe this process,
since the defense has very little, if any, bargaining power. Perhaps a
more honest descriptive phrase would be "capitulation to the
government's best offer."
Counsel is faced with a complex series of decisions about
whether to make a proffer, enter a plea, or go to trial. Exercising the
right to be tried by a jury has become a dicey and often unwise
proposition, but knowing whether and when to plead may be equally
fraught with peril. Many cases with multiple defendants (e.g., drug
cases) often have little hard evidence but a parade of cooperating co-
defendants by the time the case goes to trial.63 While a reasonable
jury might question the motives of a single co-defendant receiving the
benefit of a substantially reduced sentence, that concern likely will
fall away upon hearing several such witnesses tell coordinated stories
Moreover, the defendant faces substantial prison time if he elects to
go to trial and loses.
Additionally, some prosecutors may place stringent time limits
on the availability of a preconditional or regular plea agreement,
creating a hurried atmosphere in which defendants are rightly fearful
of losing a potentially good deal but may not know enough about the
prosecution's case to properly evaluate the offer.6" Moreover, some
prosecutors may be unwilling to share information with defense
counsel unless the case is going to trial5 as the Supreme Court does
not require pre-plea disclosure of either inculpatory or impeachment
evidence.& Finally, even if prosecutors disclose exculpatory
information, they are subject to the well-recognized bias problems
63. By far the single largest category of federal prosecution is felony drug trafficking.
See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES COMMENCED, By OFFENSE, OCTOBER 1, 2007-
SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 (2010), http:/Ibjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2008/tables/
fjs08st401.pdf. These cases frequently have multiple defendants who cooperate and testify.
64. Interviews with Defense Attorney #1, November 28, 2010 and Defense Attorney
#2, Janaury 14, 2011 (notes on file with author).
65. See discussion about Ruiz, supra, notes 52-60. Anecdotally, some defense
attorneys claim that some federal prosecutors refuse to disclose any evidence, stating "ask
your client what he did if you want to know." Interviews with Defense Attorney #1,
November 28th, 2010, and Defense Attorney #2, (Janaury 14, 2011.). However, a
government prosecutor disagreed that such refusal to disclose was commonplace and was
usually limited to cases in which there were safety concerns for witnesses. (Interview with
Prosecutor #1, April 7, 2011) (notes on file with author).
66. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976) (noting the Constitution does
not require a prosecutor to open his files to the defendant in discovery); see discussion
concerning United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), at nn. 53-60.
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that would affect any prosecutor: deciding unilaterally what evidence
is exculpatory."
The other side of the dilemma are the legal and ethical
obligations imposed on defense counsel. A criminal defense attorney
must apprise the defendant of any potential plea offers and in
appropriate circumstances, may even have a duty to seek out plea
negotiations with the prosecution." Deciding what advice to give a
client concerning plea negotiations is difficult, yet critically important.
The Seventh Circuit stated in Johnson v. Duckworth, "[a]part from
merely being informed about the proffered agreement, we also
believe that a defendant must be involved in the decision-making
process regarding the agreement's ultimate acceptance or rejection."6
The defense attorney must ensure that the defendant understands
fully the plea agreement and provide advice on whether to accept or
reject it. As explicitly stated by the Second Circuit in Boria v. Keane,
"[t]he decision whether to plead guilty or contest criminal charges is
ordinarily the most important single decision in a criminal case ...
[and] counsel may and must give the client the benefit of counsel's
professional advice on this crucial decision." 0 With the lack of
67. For further discussion of the bias problems that would affect prosecutorial
decision-making in this context, see Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291, 307-22; Erik Luna,
System Failure, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1201, 1211 n.33 (2005); Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting
Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 494-96 (2009).
68. See Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The right lost ...
was not the right to a plea bargain as such, but rather the right to counsel's assistance in
making an informed decision once a plea had been put on the table. It has long and
clearly been held that defendants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel during all
critical stages of the criminal process . . . . Here, the right that Nunes claims he lost was
not the right to a fair trial or the right to a plea bargain, but the right to participate in the
decision as to, and to decide, his own fate-a right also clearly found in Supreme Court
law."); Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 1986) ("After examining cases
and professional standards, we fully agree with Johnson that in the ordinary case criminal
defense attorneys have a duty to inform their clients of plea agreements proffered by the
prosecution, and that failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under
the sixth and fourteenth amendments."); Hawkman v. Parratt, 661 F.2d 1161, 1171 (8th
Cir. 1981) ("We agree that under the facts of this case, counsel's failure to initiate plea
negotiations concerning the duplicitous felony counts constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel . . . . However, we do not hold that defense counsel always has a duty to initiate
plea bargaining negotiations. The legal inquiry into whether counsel rendered ineffective
assistance necessarily encompasses consideration of many relevant factors.").
69. Johnson, 793 F.2d at 902.
70. Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 496-97 (2d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added), decision
clarified on rehearing, 99 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM,
TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES (1988)); see also David P.
Leonard, Waiver of Protections Against the Use of Plea Bargains and Plea Bargaining
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discovery and the pressure to waive rights, knowing how to counsel a
client is problematic at best. Moreover, given the minimal level of
comprehension required of a defendant to waive rights, it is debatable
whether many defendants properly understand the gravity of the
choice they make when they agree to a preconditional waivers or
even standard pleas."
The U.S. Supreme Court recently held in Padilla v. Kentucky
that the defense attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to inform the defendant of deportation consequences of his
guilty plea.72  The Court stated that "[b]efore deciding whether to
plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of
competent counsel."7  The Court overruled the Kentucky Supreme
Court, which held that defense counsel was not ineffective for
neglecting to advise the defendant of possible deportation
consequences of a guilty plea, reasoning that deportation was merely
a "collateral consequence" of a guilty plea.74 The Court, however,
Statements After Mezzanatto, 23 CRIM. JUST. 8, 13 (2008) (discussing the importance of the
role of the defense attorney in ensuring the defendant understands any plea offers and
enters any plea agreements knowingly, noting that "a criminal defendant will rely heavily
on the advice of the defense attorney.").
71. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a defendant may waive an uncertain right,
as long as he does so knowingly and voluntarily. See Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,
393-94 (1987) (upholding a release-dismissal agreement, and analogizing it to a plea
agreement, that required a defendant to waive his right to file a § 1983 claim in exchange
for the prosecution's dismissal of pending criminal charges). Similarly, in United States v.
Navarro-Botello, the Ninth Circuit upheld a plea agreement that waived the right to
challenge sentencing issues on appeal over the defendant's objection that the waiver was
unknowing and involuntary because he could not have known what sentencing issues
might come up until after sentencing occurred. 912 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1990). The
court reasoned that "[w]hatever appellate issues might have been available to [the
defendant] were speculative," but that "[h]e knew he was giving up possible appeals, even
if he did not know exactly what the nature of those appeals might be." Id. at 320; see also
United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 1992) (reasoning that because plea
bargains are upheld when they include a waiver of the right to a jury trial even though
defendants cannot know how well the State will make its case, plea bargains that include a
waiver of the right to appeal should be upheld even though defendants might not know all
the potential issues on appeal). As described in footnote 19, what constitutes a "knowing
and voluntary waiver" is truly a minimal level of understanding.
72. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). "This is not a hard case to find
deficiency: The consequences of Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading
the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory and his counsel's advice
was incorrect." Id. at 1483.
73. Id. at 1480-81, (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984));
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
74. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480-81; see also Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr.,
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L.
REv. 697, 699 (2002) ("In spite of the importance of counsel, one of the most widely
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neglected to decide the issue of whether it was proper for courts to
apply "a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to
define the scope of constitutionally reasonable professional assistance
required under Strickland," because the case did not require such a
decision, due to deportation's "close connection to the criminal
process," rendering it difficult to classify as either a direct or
collateral consequence." The Court left murky both the distinction
between direct and collateral consequences as well as the attendant
obligations of counsel.16  Post-Padilla, it is unclear precisely which
consequences a defense attorney has the duty to inform his client
about that might affect the collateral litigation rights over the
conviction." Most subsequent cases have declined to expand the
limited holding of Padilla," but some cases have applied the same
accepted principles of American criminal procedure is that defense lawyers' constitutional
duty to advise clients is limited . . . while lawyers must advise clients of the direct
consequences of a guilty plea-such as the period of incarceration and the fine that will be
imposed at sentencing-eleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of
Columbia have held that lawyers need not explain collateral consequences, which,
although they might follow by operation of law, are not part of the penalty imposed by the
particular statute the defendant is accused of violating.").
75. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481-82.
76. "There is some disagreement among the courts over how to distinguish between
direct and collateral consequences." Id. at 1481 n.8.
77. The concurring justices in Padilla argued that the collateral-consequences rule
should be maintained as "it is unrealistic to expect [criminal defense attorneys] to provide
expert advice on matters that lie outside their area of training and expertise." Id. at 1487-
88 (Alito, J., & Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). The concurrence continued,
arguing that the removal in Padilla was serious:
[C]riminal convictions can carry a wide variety of consequences other than conviction and
sentencing, including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote,
disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable
discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses. A
criminal conviction may also severely damage a defendant's reputation and thus impair
the defendant's ability to obtain future employment or business opportunities. All of
those consequences are serious, but this Court has never held that a criminal defense
attorney's Sixth Amendment duties extend to providing advice about such matters.
Id. at 1488 (citing Chin & Holmes, supra note 77).
78. See e.g., United States v. Mercado, No. 3:96-165-02, 2010 WL 3360414, at *2
(S.D.W. Va. Aug. 20, 2010) ("The error complained of by Mr. Mercado-the inaccurate
calculation of criminal history-simply does not involve 'collateral consequences' within
the meaning of Padilla."); United States v. Lopez-Nieves, 2010 WL 2404334, C-06-506(1),
at *1 n.2 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2010) ("[Defendant] claims that, if counsel had investigated
his first immigration offense and deportation, then the facts of that prior removal would
have resulted in a lesser amount of incarceration in light of Padilla. The holding in
Padilla, however, was merely that counsel is constitutionally deficient if he fails to inform
his client about whether a plea carries a risk of deportation."); Brown v. Goodwin, No. 09-
211, 2010 WL 1930574, at *13 (D.N.J. May 11, 2010) (declining to find defense attorney's
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reasoning in other contexts, expanding the duty of the defense
attorney to make his client aware of the consequences of a guilty
plea.7 9 Therefore, a prudent defense attorney should also discuss
possible collateral consequences of a guilty plea to ensure the
defendant makes an informed decision. Equally true, counsel should
discuss the likely effects of a preconditional waiver if the plea
colloquy is unsuccessful, as well as the attendant waivers if it is
successful.
The defense attorney's role in plea bargaining is crucial and the
defendant must rely on counsel's judgment in accepting or rejecting
the plea offer from the government, as defendants are inexperienced
and incapable of evaluating plea offers.' It is important that a
defense attorney be able to provide an opinion that is not coercive
failure to inform defendant of civil commitment consequences of a guilty plea to be
ineffective assistance of counsel, and stating that "while Padilla's implications for cases
involving removal are clear, the holding of Padilla seems not importable-either entirely
or, at the very least, not readily importable-into scenarios involving collateral
consequences other than deportation"); People v. Cristache, 907 N.Y.S.2d 833, 843 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 2010) ("Under these circumstances, where the removal consequences of
defendant's pleas were unclear or uncertain, plea counsel was constitutionally obliged to
do no more than advise defendant that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of
adverse immigration consequences.").
79. See e.g., Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 385, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) ("[I]n light
of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, we agree
with Taylor that it is constitutionally deficient for counsel not to advise his client that
pleading guilty will make him subject to the sex offender registration requirements,"
"even if registration as a sex offender is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, the
failure to advice a client that his guilty plea will require registration is constitutionally
deficient performance."); Pridham v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-002190-MR, 2010 WL
4668961, at *1-2 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010) (holding that "[i]n light of the decision in
Padilla . . . gross misadvice concerning parole eligibility may amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel worthy of post-conviction relief" and reasoning that "the factors
relied upon in the deportation context apply with equal vigor to the circumstances of gross
misadvice about parole eligibility."); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 405 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 2010) ("[M]erely advising a client to seek outside immigration advice, without more,
now fails to meet the affirmative duty set forth in Padilla, at least where the immigration
implications of the plea were fairly straightforward . . . and where the 'specialist's' advice
was wrong.").
80. For a discussion on reasons defendants accept plea agreements even when they
are innocent and prosecutorial misconduct in plea bargaining that leads to wrongful
convictions, see Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 8-
14 (2009) (examining the potential enforcement of the general competence standard from
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 against prosecutors who fail to
exercise reasonable care to prevent false convictions).
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but instead, allows the client to make an informed decision." Further,
the Supreme Court has specified that a defense attorney has a duty to
investigate what evidence the prosecution will use against the
defendant." In Rompilla v. Beard, the Court remarked "[t]he notion
that defense counsel must obtain information that the State has and
will use against the defendant is not simply a matter of common
sense," but is a legal obligation."3 Rompilla cites the ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice as "guides to determining what is reasonable."'
Padilla likewise echoed the use of ABA Standards in this way. While
the guides are not "inexorable commands," the Court stated, they
"may be valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of
effective representation... .". Yet these legal and ethical obligations
are difficult to meet in the current climate of limited disclosure and
preconditional waivers.
The defense dilemma is thus: The attorney has little time or
ability to investigate or discover what evidence the prosecution has
against his client, is entitled to little discovery, knows the client risks
decades of prison time if she loses at trial (which, statistically, is
overwhelmingly likely to happen), and yet must advise the client on
the best strategy, often without a sound, fact-based foundation. The
dilemma posed has both constitutional and ethical implications
related to competence." The Proposed Standards provide a needed
81. See Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-
Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 909 (1998) ("The attorney will be required to
invest herself, to offer an opinion and try to persuade, but not to usurp the decision from
the client. Ultimately, it is and must be, the client's choice. The attorney, however, should
assume the responsibility and take on the burden of advising her client, with compassion
and empathy, as to whether to accept or reject a plea offer. By supplying the bases for her
opinion, she should try to persuade the client to accept her recommendation. The result
will be fully counseled decisionmaking based on truly effective assistance of counsel.").
82. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (Citing the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, the Court remarked "[t]he notion that defense counsel must obtain
information that the State has and will use against the defendant is not simply a matter of
common sense." Rather the Standards are "guides to determining what is reasonable.").
83. Id. The court further comments that this duty to investigate applies even when
the defendant wishes to plead guilty. Id.
84. Id.
85. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010).
86. Failure to provide minimally competent representation can constitute a violation
of defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). That same failure can constitute an ethical violation for the lawyer, subjecting
her to sanctions. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 ("A lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
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sea-change in defining what constitutes good practice while
providing guidance for courts' in determining the substance of
ineffectiveness under Strickland v. Washington.8
Without solid knowledge of the case the government has against
the defendant, the defense attorney cannot know whether a plea offer
would really benefit the defendant, whether she has grounds to
bargain for a better plea offer, or whether she should simply go to
trial. Moreover, requiring defendants to waive virtually all rights
before even discussing a plea needs to be reconsidered. The current
climate of plea bargaining is at odds with those ethical and
constitutional requirements, adversely affecting the lives of
defendants and the workings of the justice system as a whole. Change
is necessary and the Proposed Standards, if enacted, provide an
excellent start. By addressing specifically the issues of investigation,
waivers, and prosecutorial disclosure of evidence pre-plea, the
Proposed Standards address the very concerns raised in this article.
representation.") [hereinafter "MODEL RULES"]; id., R. 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation."). The United States Supreme Court has recently granted
certiorari on an issue related to the effective assistance of counsel in plea bargain
negotiations, addressing what remedy should be available to a criminal defendant who was
provided ineffective assistance during plea negotiations but who was later convicted
pursuant to constitutional procedures. See Cooper v. Lafler, 376 Fed. Appx. 563, 574-75
(6th Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court's grant of habeas relief where ineffective
assistance of counsel, in providing incorrect legal advice, caused the defendant to reject a
favorable plea deal and proceed to trial, where he was convicted), cert. granted, 131 S.Ct.
856 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2011); Frye v. Missouri, 311 S.W.3d 350, 353, 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)
(reversing the judgment entered on the guilty plea and deeming it withdrawn, finding
ineffective assistance of counsel where defense counsel failed to communicate an offer to
plead to an amended misdemeanor charge to the defendant), cert. granted, 131 S.Ct. 856
(U.S. Jan. 7,2011).
87. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 (2005) (noting that the ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS provide "guides to determining what is reasonable").
88. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Another change that may assist in
the government's willingness to disclose more is the new ABA STANDING COMM. ON
ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Formal Opinion 09-454, which explains that disclosure
under MODEL RULE 3.8(d) includes "favorable evidence so that the defense can decide on
its utility" and must be sufficient "to enable defense counsel to advise the defendant
regarding whether to plead guilty." This Formal Opinion also finds the prosecutor's
obligation goes further than Ruiz may require, and does not permit the prosecutor to
"seek, accept, or rely on defendant's consent." ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, Formal Op. 454, at 7 n.33 (2009). While the Department of Justice has
developed a series of new initiatives regarding disclosure, the new policies still fall short of
what the ABA requires. For more discussion of this issue, see Bruce A. Green, Beyond
Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure Obligations: Can Prosecutors' Offices Learn
from Their Laywers' Mistakes?, 31 CARDOzO L. REV. 2161, 2161-70 (2010).
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M. Summary and Discussion of the
Proposed Standards Changes
The ABA formed a Task Force to consider revisions to the
Prosecution and Defense Function Standards in 2006.89 In 2010,
Proposed Changes were circulated to the Academic Participants in
the revision process (including the author), with requests to address
specific provisions. Below is a description of those Proposed Changes
as they related to Prosecution and Defense Function waiver of rights,
along with two sets of proposed drafts from both the Standards
Committee and the Task Force.
A. Description of the Changes to the Prosecution Standards
There are several important changes to the Prosecution
Standards made by the Committee and by the Task Force. There are
new Standards suggested and substantial revisions to existing
standards. In essence, the Proposed Standards require specific proof
of knowledge of guilt before accepting pleas; full disclosure of
exculpatory information before entering plea discussions; and
admonitions against routine waivers of rights and the use of coercive
tactics (such as unreasonably short deadlines).' The standards
specifically counsel against making false representations1 and urge
prosecutors to remember the importance of actual innocence in their
handling of cases;' and they command prosecutors not to engage in
discussions with defendants without either counsel present or
counsel's approval to proceed.3
New standards indicated that prosecutors should not condition
acceptance of pleas on waiver of all rights, particularly those that
89. E-mail from Rory Little, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the
Law, to Academic Participants (July 8, 2010, 2:15 p.m.) (on file with author).
90. Proposed Standards, Prosecution Function 3-5.7 (c); Rory K. Little, The ABA's
Project to Revise the Prosecution and Defense Function Standards, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1113
(Appendix: ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Proposed Revisions to Standards for the
Prosecution Function) (2011) [hereinafter Little, App.: Proposed Prosecution Standards].
91. Proposed Standards, Prosecution Function, at (d); Little, App.: Proposed
Prosecution Standards, supra note 89.
92. Proposed Standards, Prosecution Function, at (f); Little, App.: Proposed
Prosecution Standards, supra note 89.
93. Proposed Standards, Prosecution Function, at (a); Little, App.: Proposed
Prosecution Standards, supra note 89.
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would cause a manifest injustice (actual innocence, newly discovered
evidence, appeal, habeas corpus, and ineffective assistance).94
B. Description of Changes to the Defense Standards
The changes to the defense standards in this area include a
greater definition of defense obligations to protect the accused' and
two new proposed rules on plea agreements' and opposing routine
waivers.7 Among the specific obligations for defense lawyers are the
need to obtain evidentiary discovery material, to create an
investigative and defense strategy and to take steps to protect the
client's interest, include preservation of evidence, seeking pretrial
release, hiring investigators and experts, and so forth.98
The first new proposed standard provides a comprehensive look
at plea agreements and spells out in great detail what the defense
should know and consider before urging a client to enter into plea
discussions." The second standard requires counsel to oppose routine
waivers of important rights in plea agreements.'co
In conducting plea bargaining, the Standards ask the defense
attorney not to accept plea deals that contain waivers of
constitutional rights"o' (such as the right to appeal) and to challenge
the inclusion of such a waiver even where the client is agreeable to
the plea offer." However, defense attorneys are currently left
without much bargaining room, as the prosecution has the upper
94. Proposed Standards, Prosecution Function, at 3-5(9); Little, App.: Proposed
Prosecution Standards, supra note 89.
95. Proposed Standards, Defense Function 4-3-6(b)-(d); Rory K. Little, The Role of
Reporter for a Law Project, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 747 (Appendix: ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice: Proposed Revisions to Standards for the Defense Function) (2011)
[hereinafter Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards].
96. Proposed Standards, Defense Function, at 4-6.3; Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 94.
97. Proposed Standards, Defense Function, at 4-6.4; Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 94.
98. Proposed Standards, Defense Function, at 4-3.6; Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 94.
99. Proposed Standards, Defense Function, at 4-6.3; Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 94.
100. Proposed Standards, Defense Function, at 4-6.4; Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 94.
101. Proposed Standards, Defense Function, at 4-6.4; Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 94.
102. Proposed Standards, Defense Function, at 4-6.4; Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 94.
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hand with mandatory minimum sentences. Further, in a realm of
repeat players, a defense attorney who has consistently been
accepting such plea offers on behalf of her clients might have
difficulty suddenly objecting to its inclusion. Can she now make a
genuine threat to go to trial when prosecutors are aware of her
history of accepting similar plea deals with similar clients?
Ultimately, the Standards are helpful. The Standards do advise
defense attorneys to undertake a necessary investigation to provide
defendants with better counseling before accepting or rejecting a
plea. The Standards also suggest defense attorneys should not accept
plea deals that include waivers of "important defense rights" and
prosecutors should not "routinely" require such plea waivers. The
importance of the new proposals cannot be underestimated, given the
Supreme Court's stated reliance upon them.03 They provide a
"collective" view of appropriate behavior that should become the
prevailing norm and provide individual attorneys with support for
refusing to waive clients' rights and enter plea agreements without a
sufficient foundational knowledge to provide competent advice.
103. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473,
1482 (2010).
1050 [Vol. 38:4
WAIVING RIGHTS DURING PLEA BARGAINING
Appendix I
Plea Statistics for U.S. District Courts:
Plea of guilty or Total number of




























2002 97.1% (62,084)2.9% (1,851)
2003 95.7% (69,584)4.3% (2,993)
2004 95.5% (49,341)4.5% (2,316)
2005 94.5% (50,649)5.5% (2,975)
2006 95.7% (69,399)4.3% (3,107)
2007 95.8% (69,687)4.2% (3.072)
2008 96.3% (73,616)3.7% (2,810)
2009 96.3% (78,398)3.7% (2,972)
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Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, found at http://www.albany.
edu/sourcebook
Pleas Statistics for State Courts:
2000 95% (879,200)5% (45,700)
2002 95%5%
2004 95%5%
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, found at http://www.albany.
edu/sourcebook
